Ur-Energy
Owns and operates ISR uranium projects; produces U3O8 (yellowcake) sold to US nuclear utilities under a mix of multi-year fixed/market-referenced contracts plus opportunistic spot sales. Capacity-ramp story: monetizing licensed Lost Creek capacity and bringing Shirley Basin online.
Earnings, margins, COGS & capex
Ur-Energy inflected to breakeven gross profit in FY2025 as Lost Creek production scaled (drummed pounds +65% to 410,440 lbs; captured 370,893 lbs), but revenue fell 19% to $27.2M because it sold fewer pounds (440,000 vs 570,000) while building inventory ahead of higher-priced future contract deliveries. Headline net loss of $74.9M is dominated by non-cash items (convertible/warrant fair-value moves) and development costs, not operating cash burn on mined pounds. Q1 2026 showed the ramp thesis working: capture up 48% YoY to 110,314 lbs, cash cost/lb down to $37.51, realized price up to $70.98/lb, and Shirley Basin commenced initial operations in April 2026.
Income statement — where each revenue dollar goes
% of revenueOf every $1 of revenue, ~100¢ is cost of goods and ~0¢ operating expense, leaving ~0¢ of operating profit (~75¢ net).
Revenue trend
Margins
up from -$8.97M loss in FY2024
up from -$6.19/lb in FY2024
rising with new contracts (FY2024 was $58.15)
widened from -$53.2M FY2024 (EPS -$0.17)
up from gross loss in Q1 2025
COGS structure
Cash cost per pound sold $39.46 FY2025 (down from $40.40), total cost per pound $55.52 (down from $64.34) as fixed plant costs spread over more pounds; Q1 2026 cash cost fell ~13% QoQ to $37.51/lb. COGS = wellfield development amortization, plant operating labor/reagents (resin, sulfuric acid), power, and severance/ad-valorem taxes.
Capex
Not separately quantified in headline results, but material and ongoing: Mine Unit 1 Phase 2 header houses (H1 2026), a new wastewater treatment facility, and Shirley Basin plant + wellfield construction (commercial production targeted summer 2026). Updated Lost Creek technical report (S-K 1300, effective Dec 31 2025) models 12.700M lbs remaining, post-tax NPV8 $244.1M / IRR 65.7%, life-of-mine after-tax net cash flow $442.2M, mine life extended to 2039.
Latest earnings
Operational beat on production/cost, but a wider net loss ($28.8M) — the loss is not a mining-cash story; gross profit was positive (~$1.2M).
No formal numeric guidance; priorities are Lost Creek ramp/plant optimization and achieving Shirley Basin commercial production in summer 2026 (subject to final regulatory approval). Multi-year contract book underpins 2026-2030 deliveries.
- U3O8 captured Q1 2026
- 110,314 lbs (+41% QoQ, +48% YoY)
- U3O8 drummed/dried Q1 2026
- 95,599 lbs (shipped 103,956 lbs)
- Pounds sold Q1 2026
- 55,000 at $70.98/lb
- Cash cost/lb Q1 2026
- $37.51 (-13% QoQ)
- Unrestricted cash
- $122.8M (Mar 31 2026)
- Inventory at conversion facility
- 417,231 lbs U3O8
- Shirley Basin
- Initial operations started April 2026; commercial targeted summer 2026
Growth drivers
- Lost Creek production ramp toward its 2.2M lb/yr licensed plant capacity (well below run-rate today)
- Shirley Basin second mine coming online — resin transport to Lost Creek from summer 2026, adding a second production source (combined Lost Creek + Shirley Basin licensed + toll capacity of 4.2M lbs/yr)
- Contracted sales book — base deliveries of 800,000-1,400,000 lbs/yr across 2026-2030 plus 2032/2033, at rising realized prices
- Uranium price strength (~$85/lb spot mid-2026) lifting realized prices on market-referenced contract volumes and spot sales
- US supply-security tailwind — Russian LEU/natural-U import ban (effective Aug 2024) shifting utilities to domestic/Western producers
Reported financials — SEC EDGAR
Audited GAAP figures pulled from SEC filings · latest filing 2026-03-10. The audited primary-source spine — not financial advice.
Revenue — annual (GAAP)
Margins & balance sheet — FY’25
Bull & bear
A permitted, low-cash-cost US ISR producer sitting on 2.2M lbs/yr of licensed Lost Creek capacity that it is finally ramping, a second fully-permitted mine (Shirley Basin) now producing, a multi-year contracted sales book, and a net-cash balance sheet — all levered to a structurally tight Western uranium market where US-domiciled supply commands a premium.
- Operating leverage is enormous: Lost Creek is licensed for 2.2M lbs/yr but sold only 440k lbs in 2025; each incremental pound at ~$37/lb cash cost and $70+/lb price drops high-margin revenue
- Q1 2026 proved the ramp is working — capture +48% YoY to 110,314 lbs, cash cost down to $37.51/lb, realized price $70.98 — the trend, not the level, is the thesis
- Shirley Basin adds a second production engine on already-permitted ground, de-risking the growth path to combined 4.2M lb/yr capacity
- Multi-year contracts (800k-1.4M lbs/yr through 2030, plus 2032/2033) give rare revenue visibility and let the company sell into strength
- US supply-security politics (Russian import ban, DOE reserve, nuclear/AI-power demand) create a durable domestic-producer premium
- ~$123M cash and roughly net-cash position fund the ramp without imminent forced dilution
Ur-Energy has promised production ramps for years and repeatedly under-delivered against its licensed capacity; it is a sub-scale, loss-making junior burning cash, diluting shareholders, and reporting a $74.9M annual loss on $27.2M of revenue, whose valuation already prices in a smooth ramp that its operating history says is far from guaranteed.
- Chronic execution gap: the plant is licensed for 2.2M lbs/yr but drummed only ~410k lbs in 2025 (captured 371k) — the ramp has been slow and plagued by flow-rate/plant repairs
- The economics don't yet work at scale: FY2025 gross profit was a rounding error ($74k) and the net loss widened to $74.9M
- Valuation is rich on fundamentals — ~$536M market cap on ~$27-31M revenue (~17x sales) values future pounds, not current earnings; any ramp slip re-rates it down
- Financing dependence: convertibles + warrants + equity have grown the share count to ~397M; more cash burn likely means more dilution (cash already fell from $122.8M in March to ~$107.5M by April)
- Commodity dependence: the whole thesis rests on uranium staying above ~$70/lb; the metal is cyclical and can round-trip fast (it fell from ~$100/lb to ~$85/lb inside H1 2026)
- Competitive squeeze: UEC and Energy Fuels are larger, better-funded US producers chasing the same utility contracts and government support
What it is worth
Small-cap producer valued on capacity/ramp optionality and reserves, not current earnings. Cross-checks: (1) EV/sales — ~$536M market cap, roughly net-cash-neutral, on ~$31M TTM revenue = ~17x, expensive on today's pounds but a fraction of that on future capacity if the ramp lands; (2) asset value — Lost Creek technical report post-tax NPV8 of $244.1M (12.7M lbs remaining, IRR 65.7%) covers ~46% of market cap for one asset before Shirley Basin and the combined M&I / Inferred resource; (3) capacity-monetization — 2.2M lb/yr licensed Lost Creek plus Shirley Basin at ~$35/lb margin implies a materially different earnings base than 440k lbs sold in 2025.
Ramp stalls again on plant/flow issues, uranium price rounds-trips below $60/lb, and continued losses force dilutive financing — the ~17x-sales premium compresses sharply and the equity de-rates.
Steady but slower-than-licensed ramp; Shirley Basin reaches commercial production H2 2026; company sells its contracted 0.8-1.4M lbs/yr at rising realized prices, turning cash-flow positive on mining while headline P&L stays noisy from convertible/warrant marks. Valuation range-bound with the uranium price.
Ramp reaches multi-million-lb annual sales at $70+/lb realized and ~$37/lb cash cost while spot stays firm; combined Lost Creek + Shirley Basin capacity plus the remaining resource re-rate the equity well above trailing sales multiples.
The stock is a leveraged bet on execution + uranium price. It looks expensive on trailing fundamentals and cheap on delivered capacity; the gap between those two is exactly the ramp-execution and price risk. Vintage 2026-07.
SWOT
Strengths
- One of the largest and most advanced permitted ISR uranium platforms in the US — Lost Creek plant licensed for up to 2.2M lbs/yr (combined 4.2M lbs/yr licensed + toll with Shirley Basin), currently running well below capacity (operating leverage upside)
- Low-cost ISR method — cash cost ~$37-39/lb versus ~$70+/lb realized prices and ~$85/lb spot — genuine positive cash margin per pound
- Fully permitted second mine (Shirley Basin) already producing solution as of April 2026, giving a near-term second revenue source without new licensing risk
- Contracted, multi-year sales book (800k-1.4M lbs/yr 2026-2030) provides revenue visibility rare for a junior miner
- Strong balance sheet for its size: ~$123M cash, roughly net-cash-neutral after the $120M convertible
Weaknesses
- Sub-scale and unprofitable — FY2025 revenue only $27.2M against a $74.9M net loss; still burning cash through the ramp
- Production has repeatedly lagged plant capacity — flow-rate/plant issues required modifications and repairs; execution risk on the ramp is the core question
- Large reported net losses inflated by non-cash convertible/warrant fair-value volatility, which muddies the earnings signal and pressures the share price
- Chose to sell fewer pounds in 2025 (440k vs 570k) and build inventory — revenue optics fell even as production rose
- Dilution history: relies on equity, warrants, and convertibles to fund construction (share count ~397M)
Opportunities
- Uranium bull market driven by nuclear restart/newbuild, SMRs, and AI/data-center power demand — higher spot supports future contract pricing
- Structural Western supply gap after the Russian import ban and enrichment-supply tightness favors US-domiciled producers
- Ramping Lost Creek + Shirley Basin toward combined licensed capacity could multiply pounds sold at rising prices
- US government support for domestic fuel supply (DOE uranium reserve, potential strategic purchases) is a demand tailwind for US ISR producers
- Third-party toll processing at the Lost Creek plant is an incremental revenue lever
Threats
- Uranium price is cyclical and thinly traded — a spot pullback compresses spot-linked realizations and sentiment (spot round-tripped from ~$100/lb in Jan 2026 to ~$85/lb by June)
- Larger, better-capitalized US peers (UEC, Energy Fuels) and Canadian majors (Cameco) compete for utility contracts
- Continued production shortfalls vs plan would break the operating-leverage thesis and force more dilutive financing
- Regulatory/permitting and groundwater-restoration liabilities inherent to ISR mining
- Contract structure risk — fixed-price/base-escalated volumes may under-realize if spot spikes far above contract floors
Moats, dependencies & bottlenecks
Moats
Lost Creek (2.2M lbs/yr license) and Shirley Basin are fully permitted (combined 4.2M lbs/yr licensed + toll) — US uranium permitting takes many years, a real barrier to new entrants.
ISR is structurally cheaper than conventional mining; cash cost ~$37-39/lb gives positive margin, but peers (UEC, enCore) use the same method.
Multi-year contracts with US utilities create switching friction and revenue visibility, but are re-competed each cycle.
Weak-to-Moderate Policy-driven (import ban, DOE) rather than firm-specific; benefits all US producers, not URG uniquely.
Dependencies
Revenue and sentiment track U3O8 price (~$85/lb spot mid-2026); a downcycle hits realizations and financing access.
Customer concentration Sales go to a small number of utilities under multi-year agreements; loss/non-renewal of a contract is material.
U3O8 must be converted downstream; conversion-capacity tightness affects the fuel chain URG feeds into.
Ramp + construction funded by equity/warrants/convertibles; access to cheap capital is essential while FCF is negative.
ISR requires aquifer-restoration commitments and ongoing regulatory compliance.
sulfuric acid, contractors) Consumables and wellfield drilling drive cash cost/lb.
Advantages
- Fully permitted, most-advanced US ISR platform with large unused licensed capacity
- Genuine positive cash margin per pound at current prices (~$37 cost vs ~$70+ realized)
- Second permitted mine (Shirley Basin) already in production — rare optionality for a junior
- Contracted multi-year revenue visibility through 2030
- Net-cash balance sheet (~$123M cash) relative to peers of similar size
Weaknesses
- Persistent gap between licensed capacity and actual production; slow, repair-prone ramp
- Unprofitable at current scale with large, partly non-cash net losses
- Ongoing dilution to fund construction (~397M shares)
- Small absolute size vs US peers UEC and Energy Fuels
- Entirely commodity-price dependent; no diversification
Bottlenecks
- Wellfield/plant flow rates — the binding constraint on how fast Lost Creek reaches licensed capacity (past shortfalls needed plant modifications/repairs)
- Header-house and wastewater-treatment build-out timing (Mine Unit 1 Phase 2, H1 2026) gating throughput
- Shirley Basin commissioning and resin-transport logistics to Lost Creek (final regulatory approval pending for commercial status)
- Capital availability to fund the ramp without excessive dilution
- Downstream conversion/enrichment capacity in the broader fuel chain
Top signals & trends
Top signals
Supports realized pricing on spot and market-referenced contract volumes.
Structural Western supply gap favoring US-domiciled producers.
Direct evidence the Lost Creek ramp and Shirley Basin start are progressing.
Headline P&L still poor; loss magnitude driven by development + non-cash fair-value items.
Funds the build but adds dilution/leverage and mark-to-market P&L noise.
Revenue visibility and a floor for the sales book.
Trends
Long-cycle demand growth for U3O8.
Utilities and hyperscalers contracting nuclear baseload lifts fuel demand.
Import ban + enrichment tightness favor US producers.
Volatile prices swing junior-producer valuations sharply (spot ran to ~$100/lb in Jan 2026 then eased to ~$85/lb).
Many US juniors ramping at once could temper the long-run price if demand disappoints.
Ecosystem & competitor graph
Suppliers feed the company; customers pull from it. Line thickness shows the strength of each tie (supply-chain dependency, customer earnings contribution). Hover to isolate a tie.
Resin, sulfuric acid, oxygen/CO2 and other consumables that drive ISR cash cost/lb.
Third-party drilling/construction for header houses and monitoring wells gating throughput.
Honeywell / ConverDyn (Metropolis conversion) US conversion capacity downstream of U3O8; the next step in the fuel chain URG feeds.
Buyers under multi-year sales agreements (base 800k-1.4M lbs/yr 2026-2030); individual counterparties not publicly named.
Potential strategic buyer via the domestic uranium reserve / fuel-security programs.
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