
Applied Digital
Own/develop energized, grid-connected data-center campuses and lease critical-IT capacity (measured in MW) to GPU tenants under long-dated (~15-year) take-or-pay leases. The economic engine is the spread between contracted lease revenue and the combined debt-service + preferred-dividend + depreciation cost of the built campuses. Unlike a neocloud (CoreWeave/Nebius), Applied Digital does NOT own the GPUs or operate the cloud — it supplies the building, power, and cooling the tenant racks GPUs into, so it carries build-execution, power-interconnect, financing, and tenant-credit risk rather than direct GPU-obsolescence risk. Effectively a leveraged, single-theme (AI-capex) real-asset landlord transitioning toward a data-center REIT.
- 2026-08-04This share price previously read ~$35.50 (as of 2 Jul 2026). Restated to $29.49 on this refresh, roughly 17% lower.
Sources — 15 figures with citations
- FY2026 total revenue and prior yearsfiled2026-05-31$611.311M FY26 vs $228.569M FY25 vs $165.575M FY24 (+167% YoY)sec.gov — Form 10-K for fiscal year ended May 31, 2026 (filed 2026-07-29), Results of Operations table. Composition: services revenue $496.609M + data center rental and other $114.702M.
- Q4 FY2026 revenue and adjusted metricsfiled2026-05-31Revenue $258.7M (+407% YoY); adjusted revenue $240.4M; adjusted EBITDA $42.4M; NOI $39.9M; adjusted net income $12.9M ($0.04/diluted sh); GAAP net loss to common -$110.6M (-$0.39/sh)sec.gov — 8-K Ex-99.1 Q4/FY2026 earnings release dated Jul 27, 2026.
- Fit-out revenue is near-zero-margin pass-throughderived2026-05-31FY26 fit-out revenue $270.6M vs $258.1M cost = ~4.6% margin; Q4 fit-out $152.4M vs $145.6M cost = ~4.5% marginsec.gov — Revenue and cost figures are each separately stated in the 10-K MD&A and the Q4 release; the margin is my arithmetic: (270.6-258.1)/270.6 = 4.6%; (152.4-145.6)/152.4 = 4.5%. This is the single most important composition fact in the quarter.
- Gross margin FY2026 (GAAP and ex-fit-out)derived2026-05-3125.8% GAAP; ~42.6% excluding fit-out; rental line alone ~50.5%sec.gov — GAAP: (611.311 - 396.858 services COGS - 56.771 rental COGS) / 611.311 = 25.79%. Ex-fit-out: (611.311-270.6=340.7 revenue) less (453.629-258.1=195.5 cost) = 145.2 / 340.7 = 42.6%. Rental: (114.702-56.771)/114.702 = 50.5%.
- Operating loss and net loss, FY2026filed2026-05-31Operating loss -$236.462M (-38.7% margin); net loss from continuing ops -$183.319M; net loss attributable to common -$250.263M incl. discontinued ops (-$249.243M continuing); basic/diluted EPS -$0.91 on 275,194,755 wtd avg sharessec.gov — 10-K Results of Operations. Loss to common includes -$59.665M attributed to noncontrolling/redeemable noncontrolling interest and -$6.259M of preferred dividends. Operating margin derived: -236.462/611.311 = -38.68%.
- Non-GAAP profitability, FY2026filed2026-05-31Adjusted revenue $539.707M; adjusted operating income $57.796M (11% margin); adjusted EBITDA $107.229M (18% of adjusted revenue); EBITDA -$65.540M; Net Operating Income $90.388M (91% margin); adjusted net income to common $36.076M ($0.11/diluted sh)sec.gov — 10-K Non-GAAP Measures and Reconciliation. All adjusted measures exclude the consolidated subsidiary ChronoScale, and adjusted operating income also excludes stock-based compensation - a material exclusion given SG&A rose $224.2M with ~$198.3M of that being the SBC increase.
- Debt at May 31, 2026 and post-year-end additionsfiled2026-05-31Scheduled debt principal $5,306.680M; long-term debt net $4,959.516M + current portion $16.422M (net of $330.742M deferred financing costs); finance leases $58.316M; plus $1.59B 7.000% Senior Secured Notes due 2031 closed after year-endsec.gov — 10-K contractual-obligations schedule (principal, with $4,194.954M maturing FY2031), balance sheet, and Note 8 - Debt. Contractual future interest $1,784.691M total, $377.502M in FY2027. Post-year-end notes disclosed in the Q4 release subsequent-events section.
- Cash, restricted cash and net debtderived2026-05-31Cash $1,591.988M + restricted cash $2,381.027M at May 31, 2026 (vs $43.950M + $72.368M at May 31, 2025); net debt ~$3.77B ex-restricted, ~$1.39B including restrictedsec.gov — Balance-sheet lines are filed. Net debt is my arithmetic: 5,306.680 + 58.316 - 1,591.988 = 3,773.008; including restricted cash: 3,773.008 - 2,381.027 = 1,391.981. Restricted cash is largely construction escrow, so both framings are shown rather than picking one.
- Capital expenditure and free cash flow, FY2026derived2026-05-31Purchases of property, equipment and other assets $2,865.765M (469% of revenue); operating cash flow +$89.685M; implied FCF ~-$2,776M; financing inflow $6,876.826Msec.gov — Cash-flow lines filed in the 10-K (capex $2,865.765M vs $681.603M FY25; net investing -$2,936.397M). Derived: 2,865.765/611.311 = 468.8% capex intensity; 89.685 - 2,865.765 = -2,776.080 FCF = -454% of revenue.
- Contracted lease portfolio by campusfiled2026-05-311,410 MW / ~$36.2B base-term contracted revenue (~$86B with all renewals): Polaris Forge 1 CoreWeave 400MW ~$11.0B (2H25-1H27); Polaris Forge 2 IG hyperscaler 200MW ~$5.0B (2H26-1H27); Polaris Forge 3 300MW ~$7.5B (2H27-2H28); Delta Forge 1 300MW ~$7.5B (1H27-1H28); Delta Forge 2 210MW ~$5.2B (1H28)sec.gov — 10-K Item 1 Business portfolio table; all leases 15-year initial base terms, renewal options excluded from the dollar amounts. Polaris Forge 3, Delta Forge 1 and Delta Forge 2 are all with the same high investment-grade hyperscaler (~$20B combined) per the Q4 release.
- Preferred / redeemable noncontrolling interest ranked above commonfiled2026-05-31Redeemable noncontrolling interest $1,956.303M; Series E preferred $6.306M; Series E-1 preferred $56.460M (temporary equity). Total stockholders' equity attributable to APLD $1,717.476M on $9,929.312M total assetssec.gov — 10-K consolidated balance sheet, temporary-equity section. The redeemable NCI is the preferred units + corresponding common units at APLD HPC TopCo 2, carrying redemption and contingent-dividend-rate-increase features valued with a binomial lattice model (Level 3).
- Live and operating capacityfiled2026-07-27175 MW live at Polaris Forge 1 (first 100 MW operational Oct 2025; Building 2 Phase 1 75 MW reached Ready-for-Service post-quarter); 286 MW of bitcoin-hosting capacity across two North Dakota sites; ~1.7 GW additional capacity being marketedsec.gov — 8-K Ex-99.1 subsequent-events and management commentary. HPC Hosting segment Q4 revenue $203.0M ($44.1M base rent + $152.4M fit-out + $6.5M recoveries) produced $26.2M of segment operating profit.
- Share price (close)market2026-08-03$29.49query1.finance.yahoo.com — Regular-session CLOSE for Mon Aug 3, 2026 (regularMarketTime 2026-08-03 20:00 UTC = 16:00 ET), NasdaqGS, USD. 52-week range $12.35-$50.73. Cross-checked against api.nasdaq.com pre-market Aug 4 quote of $30.04. Not an intraday high. Post-earnings path: $26.38 (Jul 27) - $26.62 (Jul 28) - $23.22 (Jul 29, -12.8%) - $27.97 (Jul 30) - $27.39 (Jul 31) - $29.49 (Aug 3).
- Market capitalizationderived2026-08-03~$8.59Bsec.gov — 291,469,112 shares outstanding as of Jul 28, 2026 (10-K cover page) x $29.49 Aug 3, 2026 close = $8,593M. EV ~$12.4B adding net debt ex-restricted-cash ($3.77B); ~$14.4B adding the $1.96B redeemable preferred/NCI and $63M Series E/E-1.
- Q4 FY2026 consensus beat and market reactionmarket2026-07-30Revenue $258.7M vs ~$94-95M consensus (~$164M beat); adjusted EPS $0.04 vs ~-$0.19 expected; stock -12.8% on Jul 29 on the ~$5.0B debt loadtechtimes.com — Sell-side consensus is a third-party aggregate, not a filed figure. The -12.8% move is corroborated by the price series ($26.62 Jul 28 close to $23.22 Jul 29 close = -12.8%).
The thesis on this name
State of the AI Cloud
Purpose-built AI-factory landlord with a diversifying tenant set (CoreWeave ~$7B + a separate ~$5B IG hyperscaler), Macquarie financing, and a REIT-conversion re-rating option distinct from the GPU-cycle beta.
State of the AI Cloud
A specific asymmetric catalyst distinct from the GPU-cycle beta: a purpose-built AI-factory landlord with a diversifying tenant set (~$7B CoreWeave + a separate ~$5B IG-hyperscaler lease at Polaris Forge 2), Macquarie financing, and a REIT-conversion option that could re-rate the equity from a developer multiple to a datacenter-REIT multiple. 1GW+ power runway at Ellendale ND.
State of the AI Cloud
Purpose-built AI-factory landlord with a diversifying tenant set (CoreWeave + a separate IG hyperscaler), Macquarie financing, and a REIT-conversion re-rating option.
State of the AI Cloud
Diversifying tenant book (CoreWeave + IG hyperscaler), Macquarie financing, and a REIT-conversion re-rate option distinct from the GPU-cycle beta.
Earnings, margins, COGS & capex
Applied Digital is growing revenue triple-digits off a tiny base (Q3 FY26 $126.6M, +139% YoY; ~$319M LTM) as its first North Dakota AI-factory buildings energize, and is adjusted-EBITDA positive ($44.1M in Q3, ~35% margin). But it is GAAP loss-making (net loss ~-$100.9M in Q3, inflated by ~$48.9M SBC and a ~$59.7M Cloud Services write-down) and burns cash building campuses that cost far more than current revenue. The company points to a large contracted-lease book — company-claimed ~$36B base-term contracted revenue (~$86B if all renewal options are exercised), ~70% backed by US investment-grade hyperscalers — as multi-year visibility. The model is a leveraged landlord bet: fund the build with Macquarie perpetual preferred (12.75%/yr), $2.15B 6.75% secured notes, and development loans, then convert to a REIT to re-rate on lease NOI. The bear edge sits in the gap between company-claimed contracted revenue and today's GAAP losses, the expensive preferred capital, tenant concentration on CoreWeave, and pure execution/power-interconnect risk on the ND ramp.
Income statement — where each revenue dollar goes
% of revenueOf every $1 of revenue, ~74¢ is cost of goods and ~26¢ operating expense, and the remainder is an operating loss.
Revenue trend
Margins
improving off a low base - adj. EBITDA $44.1M vs ~$6.3M a year ago as leased capacity energizes [fact]
negative - weighed by ~$48.9M SBC + ~$59.7M Cloud Services write-down + depreciation/interest [fact]
negative - structural while campuses are built; capex >> revenue [estimate]
COGS structure
COGS/operating cost is dominated by data-center operating expense on the energized campuses: power/electricity, facility and cooling operating cost, and site operations/staffing. The far larger economic cost sits below that as (1) depreciation on the built campuses and (2) financing cost - the $2.15B 6.75% senior secured notes and, critically, the Macquarie perpetual preferred that accrues a 12.75%/yr dividend (a very expensive cost of capital that is not GAAP interest but is a real, senior economic drain on common equity). A GAAP net loss (~-$100.9M in Q3) persists once SBC, the Cloud Services write-down, depreciation, and financing are loaded on top of adj.-EBITDA-positive operations.
Capex
Very high and the defining feature: Applied Digital is mid-build on multiple North Dakota AI-factory campuses (Polaris Forge 1 first 100MW building energized; additional buildings and Polaris Forge 2 under construction), with 1+ GW of power under study at Ellendale and a company-claimed ~1.4 GW of contracted critical-IT load across five campuses. Capex vastly exceeds revenue and is funded by the up-to-$5B Macquarie preferred (~$900M drawn late-2025, incl. a $787.5M second draw), $2.15B 6.75% senior secured notes, and Macquarie development loans - a project-finance-style recycling structure. This is the source of both the growth and the balance-sheet/financing risk. [fact/company-claimed for GW figures]
Latest earnings
Enormous headline beat, hostile market reaction. Q4 revenue $258.7M vs a consensus of roughly $94-95M (a ~$164M beat) and adjusted EPS $0.04 vs a ~-$0.19 expected loss. But GAAP net loss attributable to common was -$110.6M in Q4 (-$0.39/sh) and -$249.2M for FY26 (-$0.91/sh), and $152.4M of the Q4 revenue was one-time tenant fit-out services carrying $145.6M of matching cost. The stock fell ~12.8% on Jul 29 on the ~$5.0B debt load and the recognition that the beat was largely non-recurring pass-through.
No numeric FY2027 revenue / EBITDA guidance was issued in the Q4 FY26 release or the 10-K. Management guides qualitatively and by contracted backlog instead: ~1,410 MW of contracted critical IT load across five campuses at ~$36B of base-term contracted revenue (~$86B if all renewal options exercise), delivery phased 2H25-2H28; an additional ~1.7 GW actively being marketed; and a statement that heavy PP&E investment continues through FY2027. Delivery dates by campus: Polaris Forge 1 2H25-1H27, Polaris Forge 2 2H26-1H27, Delta Forge 1 1H27-1H28, Polaris Forge 3 2H27-2H28, Delta Forge 2 1H28.
- FY2026 revenue
- $611.3M (+167% YoY); Q4 FY26 $258.7M (+407% YoY)
- Rental vs fit-out mix
- FY26 rental revenue only $114.7M ($99.8M base rent + $14.9M recoveries); fit-out $270.6M at ~4.6% margin
- Adjusted EBITDA
- FY26 $107.2M (18% of adjusted revenue) vs $19.6M FY25; Q4 $42.4M
- Net Operating Income
- FY26 $90.4M (91% NOI margin on base rent); Q4 $39.9M
- GAAP net loss attributable to common
- FY26 -$249.2M continuing ops (-$0.91/sh); Q4 -$110.6M (-$0.39/sh)
- Contracted portfolio
- 1,410 MW across 5 campuses; ~$36.2B base-term contracted revenue, ~$86B with all renewals
- New leases signed / announced
- Delta Forge 1 (300MW, ~$7.5B), Polaris Forge 3 (300MW, ~$7.5B), Delta Forge 2 (210MW, ~$5.2B) - all with the SAME high investment-grade hyperscaler, ~$20B combined
- Live capacity
- 175 MW at Polaris Forge 1 (first 100MW live Oct 2025; Building 2 Phase 1 75MW reached RFS on schedule post-quarter)
- Bitcoin-hosting segment
- 286 MW across two North Dakota sites - capacity-based fees, described by the CEO as the highest return-on-assets business in the company
- Total debt principal
- $5,306.7M scheduled principal (vs long-term debt net $4,959.5M after $330.7M deferred financing costs); ~$4,195.0M of it matures in FY2031
- Interest burden
- $85.3M of interest expense recognized FY26 (net of capitalized amounts) vs $35.3M FY25; contractual future interest on existing debt $1,784.7M, incl. $377.5M due in FY2027
- Cash position
- $1,592.0M unrestricted + $2,381.0M restricted (May 31, 2026), from $44.0M + $72.4M a year earlier
- Financing raised in FY26
- $6,876.8M net cash from financing: ~$4.1B net new debt, $1.8B NCI capital contribution, $627.8M net stock issuance
- Post-quarter financings
- $1.59B 7.000% Senior Secured Notes due 2031 (at par, APLD ComputeCo 3) repaying the $300M bridge; revolver upsized to $430M committed + $120M accordion
Growth drivers
- Anchor CoreWeave leases — two ~15-yr leases for 250MW critical IT + an additional 150MW = ~400MW at Ellendale/Polaris Forge 1 ND; company-claimed ~$7B of revenue over the terms (~$11B of contracted backlog per the Q3 disclosure) [company-claimed]
- Separate ~$5B AI-factory lease with an undisclosed US investment-grade hyperscaler at the Polaris Forge 2 ND campus [company-claimed]
- Company-claimed ~$36B total base-term contracted revenue (~$86B if all renewal options exercised), ~70% backed by US investment-grade hyperscalers [company-claimed]
- 1+ GW power runway under study at Ellendale ND — company-claimed ~1.4 GW contracted critical-IT load across five campuses [company-claimed]
- REIT conversion — re-rate the equity from a developer multiple to a datacenter-REIT multiple on lease NOI (company target ~$1B annual NOI within ~5 years) [company-claimed/plan]
- Macquarie financing partnership (up-to-$5B perpetual preferred + development loans) funds the build without diluting common at the campus level (Macquarie takes 15% common in the HPC assets; APLD retains 85%) [fact]
Reported financials — SEC EDGAR
Audited GAAP figures pulled from SEC filings · latest filing 2026-07-29. The audited primary-source spine — not financial advice.
Revenue — annual (GAAP)
Margins & balance sheet — FY’26
Bull & bear
The contracted book got dramatically bigger and dramatically better-rated: three new 15-year take-or-pay leases (Delta Forge 1, Polaris Forge 3, Delta Forge 2) totalling ~$20B were all signed with the SAME high investment-grade hyperscaler, taking the portfolio to 1,410 MW and ~$36B of base-term contracted revenue. And unlike most AI-infrastructure promises, the delivery track record is on schedule.
- Repeat business from a single high-IG hyperscaler is the strongest available third-party validation: the same customer chose Applied Digital three consecutive times, in three different states, for 810 MW and ~$20B of base-term revenue. Customers with alternatives do not re-up three times with an operator they doubt.
- The backlog is contractually take-or-pay over 15-year base terms: ~$36.2B across 1,410 MW, ~$86B if renewal options exercise (three five-year options per campus, two at Polaris Forge 2). Backlog of that duration against a ~$8.6B market cap is the core of the thesis.
- Delivery is actually happening on schedule - the differentiator management claims and, in this cohort, the rarest one. Polaris Forge 1's first 100 MW energized in October 2025, and Building 2 Phase 1 (75 MW) hit Ready-for-Service on time post-quarter, taking live capacity to 175 MW.
- The underlying rental economics are genuinely good once the pass-through is stripped out: FY26 rental revenue $114.7M against $56.8M of cost, and Net Operating Income $90.4M on $99.8M of base rent - a ~91% NOI margin. Adjusted EBITDA scaled 5.5x to $107.2M and Q4 adjusted EPS was positive at $0.04.
- Operating cash flow turned positive for the first time (+$89.7M in FY26 vs -$115.4M in FY25), so the operating business is no longer a cash drain - the cash burn is entirely discretionary construction capex.
- Capital access has been proven at scale and at improving terms: $6.88B of financing in FY26, including $2.15B of 6.750% secured notes and, post-quarter, $1.59B of 7.000% notes issued AT PAR (vs 98% of par for the prior tranche), plus a revolver upsized to $430M committed. Counterparty credit was also hardened - CoreWeave lease security was restructured with springing guarantees from CoreWeave, Inc. and a $50M letter of credit following CoreWeave's A3-rated refinancing.
- A ~1.7 GW additional pipeline is being actively marketed, plus roughly 3 GW of near-term gross utility power in diligence and a ~1.2 GW front-of-meter gas generation project via Base Electron (APLD holds ~10%) - power access, not demand, is the industry bottleneck, and this is an attempt to own that constraint.
- The Cloud Services distraction is gone: separated into ChronoScale (Nasdaq: CHRN, ~96% owned) and excluded from non-GAAP measures, leaving a cleaner landlord story - plus a stable 286 MW bitcoin-hosting business paid on capacity, not BTC price.
The 167% / 407% revenue growth is largely a zero-margin construction pass-through: fit-out services generated $270.6M of FY26 revenue against $258.1M of cost. Strip that out and the real business is ~$115M of rental revenue against $5.3B of debt (already ~$6.9B pro forma), $1.96B of preferred sitting above common, and a $249M GAAP loss. The market saw it - the stock fell ~12.8% two days after the beat.
- The headline growth is an accounting artifact of construction, not operating scale: FY26 tenant fit-out revenue $270.6M at $258.1M of cost = ~4.6% margin; Q4 $152.4M at $145.6M = ~4.5%. Management itself flags fit-out will not repeat at this scale. Recurring rental revenue is only $114.7M - roughly 19% of the headline.
- Leverage is the dominant risk and it is still climbing: $5,306.7M of scheduled debt principal at May 31, 2026 (from ~$700M a year earlier), plus $1.59B of new 7.000% notes closed after year-end - roughly $6.9B pro forma. Contractual interest on existing debt alone totals $1,784.7M, with $377.5M due in FY2027 against $611M of FY26 revenue.
- The capital structure buries common equity: $1,956.3M of redeemable noncontrolling interest (preferred units at APLD HPC TopCo 2, with embedded redemption and contingent-dividend-rate-increase features valued by a third-party specialist using a binomial lattice) plus $62.8M of Series E/E-1 preferred sit in temporary equity ahead of common. Book equity attributable to APLD is $1,717.5M against $9,929.3M of total assets.
- Customer concentration is now extreme in a new way: ~$20B of the ~$36B backlog is with ONE unnamed high-investment-grade hyperscaler and ~$11.0B with CoreWeave. Two counterparties are effectively the entire book, and the CoreWeave exposure required a restructured SPV, springing guarantees and a $50M letter of credit to make it financeable - a tell that the original credit was thin.
- Nearly all of the contracted revenue is unbuilt: of 1,410 MW contracted, only 175 MW is live. Delta Forge 2 does not deliver until 1H2028. Every dollar of that $36B depends on multi-year construction, power interconnection and equipment lead-times (management explicitly flags generator lead-times and steel/copper commodity risk) executing on schedule.
- Stock-based comp is a very large real cost being adjusted away: SG&A rose $224.2M to $332.1M, of which ~$198.3M was the increase in SBC. Management's non-GAAP measures exclude it, which is how a -$236.5M GAAP operating loss becomes +$57.8M 'adjusted operating income'.
- Reported results carry heavy non-operating noise that flattered the loss: a $75.8M gain on change in fair value of derivatives (mostly the Babcock & Wilcox warrant) and a $10.8M gain on investments offset a $59.7M loss on the Cloud/ChronoScale held-for-sale write-down. None of it is operating cash.
- The REIT conversion is NOT mentioned in the FY2026 10-K or the Q4 earnings release. Third-party coverage still describes it as under consideration, so the re-rating catalyst is at best unconfirmed at 4 August 2026.
- Related-party and off-balance-sheet complexity is increasing: Base Electron is a non-consolidated VIE ~10% owned by APLD but managed partly by APLD officers and directors in their individual capacities, funded by an APLD demand note that grew to $58.6M with a $100M advance ceiling, and APLD guaranteed (then was released from) B&W's 1.2 GW design-build obligations. That is a lot of structure around the power story.
- No formal FY2027 guidance was given - investors are asked to underwrite a $36B backlog with no management-provided revenue or EBITDA bridge to it.
What it is worth
Multiple / re-rating framing, not a clean DCF. EV ~$11B vs ~$319M LTM revenue is meaningless on trailing multiples - the equity is priced on the company-claimed ~$36B base-term contracted backlog converting to lease NOI (company target ~$1B annual NOI within ~5 years) and a REIT re-rate. The value question is threefold: does the backlog convert on schedule, does the REIT conversion complete, and does tenant credit (esp. CoreWeave) hold. Sell-side skews bullish (Strong Buy consensus, ~$73 mean target vs ~$35.50 spot as of 2 Jul 2026) but that target embeds successful execution on all three; the base case is far more contingent.
~$9-25
an AI-capex air-pocket, a CoreWeave tenant-credit scare, a REIT-conversion delay/failure, or a ND build/financing slip re-rates the equity toward the low end of the 52-wk range [estimate]
~$30-45 (near current ~$35.50)
triple-digit revenue growth continues but GAAP losses, expensive preferred, tenant concentration, and unrealized REIT conversion cap the multiple; range-bound on each build/print [estimate]
~$50-73+ (prior 52-wk high ~$50.73
sell-side ~$73 mean target): REIT conversion completes, backlog converts to NOI on schedule, tenants diversify beyond CoreWeave, financing drag eases [estimate]
Company-claimed contracted-revenue and GW figures flatter the picture - they are not delivered GAAP revenue, and the 12.75% Macquarie preferred is an expensive, senior claim excluded from headline net debt. Valuing on the backlog assumes the ND build energizes on time, the tenants take and pay, and the REIT conversion completes - a stack of contingent assumptions. [estimate]
SWOT
Strengths
- Owns the scarce asset — energized, grid-connected, interconnect-queued power and shell in North Dakota - which is the real 2026 bottleneck, not the GPUs [fact]
- Long-dated (~15-yr) take-or-pay leases to creditworthy tenants (CoreWeave anchor + a separate US investment-grade hyperscaler) give multi-year revenue visibility if the build executes [company-claimed]
- No direct GPU-obsolescence risk — the tenant owns and replaces the accelerators; Applied Digital's asset is the long-life building/power [estimate]
- Deep-pocketed financing partner — Macquarie's up-to-$5B perpetual preferred + development loans fund the build; APLD keeps 85% of the HPC assets [fact]
- Adjusted-EBITDA positive ($44.1M Q3 FY26, ~35% margin) as the first campuses energize [fact]
Weaknesses
- Persistent GAAP net losses (~-$100.9M Q3 FY26) and very high capital intensity - capex vastly exceeds revenue while campuses are built [fact]
- Expensive capital — the Macquarie perpetual preferred accrues a 12.75%/yr dividend (stepping up further at yrs 5-6) - a heavy, senior economic drain on common equity distinct from the 6.75% notes [fact]
- Tenant concentration — CoreWeave is the anchor and largest single tenant (~$11B of the backlog / ~400MW) - a neocloud whose own credit is leveraged [fact/estimate]
- REIT conversion is a plan, not done — the central re-rating thesis is unrealized and carries structuring/tax-qualification execution risk [fact]
- Execution + power-interconnect risk on a remote North Dakota build ramp; backlog is company-claimed contracted revenue, not yet delivered GAAP revenue [fact/estimate]
Opportunities
- REIT conversion re-rates the equity from a developer multiple to a datacenter-REIT multiple on lease NOI - an asymmetric option distinct from pure GPU-cycle beta [company-claimed/estimate]
- Additional hyperscaler leases beyond CoreWeave diversify the tenant book and de-risk concentration if executed [estimate]
- Cloud Services divestiture (~$570M cash) simplifies the story into a pure landlord and reduces financing dependence [fact]
- 1+ GW of power runway under study at Ellendale supports multi-campus expansion if demand and interconnect hold [company-claimed]
- Structural AI-capex super-cycle keeps energized-power demand tight, supporting lease rates and renewals [estimate]
Threats
- AI-capex air-pocket / sentiment reversal — a single-theme (AI-DC) landlord is highly exposed if hyperscaler/neocloud GPU demand and financing appetite soften [estimate]
- Tenant credit shock — if CoreWeave (or another leveraged neocloud tenant) stumbles, the lease income one layer down is impaired [estimate]
- Financing/refinancing risk — a capital-intensive buildout dependent on continued Macquarie draws, secured notes, and development loans is exposed to a risk-off market [fact/estimate]
- Power/interconnect + construction delays on the ND campuses could slip backlog conversion and NOI timing [estimate]
- REIT conversion could be delayed, altered, or fail qualification — collapsing the re-rating catalyst [estimate]
Moats, dependencies & bottlenecks
Moats
grid-connected, interconnect-queued power + campus real estate (Ellendale/Polaris Forge ND) permitted power + interconnect queue position is genuinely scarce and slow to replicate, but not exclusive; other developers and miners chase the same MW The real edge - the scarce asset in 2026 is energized MW, not GPUs; but power is being contested by every miner-pivot and hyperscaler [fact/estimate]
contractual switching cost + revenue visibility, but only as good as tenant credit and delivery; not technological lock-in Company-claimed ~$36B contracted book is the visibility, but it is contract- not tech-locked and concentrated on CoreWeave [company-claimed]
Macquarie financing partnership (up-to-$5B preferred + dev loans) access to deep project capital is an advantage vs undercapitalized rivals, but the 12.75% preferred is expensive and a cost, not a durable barrier A funding channel, not a moat; the terms (12.75%/yr, 15% common to Macquarie) are a real economic drag [fact]
not yet in place; a re-rating option, not a competitive barrier The catalyst, not a moat; conversion is unrealized and carries qualification/execution risk [estimate]
Dependencies
Largest single tenant (~$11B of backlog / ~400MW at Polaris Forge 1); a leveraged neocloud whose own credit is contested - concentration + tenant-credit risk one layer down [fact/estimate]
Up-to-$5B perpetual preferred (12.75%/yr) + development loans fund the buildout; the build ramp depends on continued draws, and the preferred is a senior, expensive claim on economics [fact]
Backlog only converts if remote campuses are built on time and energized on schedule; grid interconnect, permitting, and construction are the gating constraints [fact/estimate]
$2.15B 6.75% notes + development loans + preferred draws; a capital-intensive build exposed to a risk-off or higher-rate market [fact/estimate]
Single-theme exposure: leases, renewals, and new campuses all rest on the AI-DC super-cycle persisting - the same one-factor bet as the rest of the compute-capacity board [estimate]
Advantages
- Owns the scarce 2026 asset — energized, grid-connected, interconnect-queued power and campus shell - rather than depreciating GPUs [fact]
- Company-claimed ~$36B base-term contracted revenue (~70% IG-hyperscaler-backed) gives multi-year visibility if it converts [company-claimed]
- No direct GPU-obsolescence risk - the tenant owns and refreshes the accelerators [estimate]
- Deep-pocketed Macquarie financing funds the buildout while APLD retains 85% of the HPC assets [fact]
- REIT-conversion optionality - a re-rate catalyst distinct from the GPU cycle [company-claimed/estimate]
Weaknesses
- Large GAAP net losses now (~-$100.9M Q3 FY26) on tiny (~$127M/qtr) revenue [fact]
- Expensive capital — 12.75%/yr Macquarie perpetual preferred (stepping up at yrs 5-6) + $2.15B 6.75% notes [fact]
- Tenant concentration on CoreWeave (~$11B of backlog / ~400MW), a leveraged neocloud [fact/estimate]
- Backlog is company-claimed contracted revenue, not delivered GAAP revenue; conversion is execution-dependent [company-claimed/estimate]
- REIT conversion is a plan, not done - the core catalyst is unrealized and reversible [fact]
- High-beta single-theme (AI-capex) equity; historically volatile, capital-hungry [fact/estimate]
Bottlenecks
- Power + grid interconnect at Ellendale/Polaris Forge — activating 1+ GW is gated by electricity, interconnect queue, and permitting [fact/estimate]
- Construction execution + timeline — converting company-claimed contracted backlog to GAAP revenue depends on completing remote ND campuses on schedule [estimate]
- Capital access — the model cannot grow faster than it can draw Macquarie preferred/dev loans + raise secured debt; rate/risk-off shocks throttle the build [fact/estimate]
- Tenant delivery/acceptance timing — lease revenue starts when the tenant takes energized capacity, so ramp cadence gates NOI [estimate]
- REIT-conversion structuring/qualification — the re-rating catalyst is gated on completing a complex tax/structure transition [estimate]
Top signals & trends
Top signals
The central re-rate catalyst; concrete progress is bullish, a delay/abandonment is a bear trigger [fact]
New non-CoreWeave leases de-risk the ~$11B concentration; a stall keeps neocloud-credit risk front and center [fact/estimate]
Company-claimed ~$36B only matters if remote ND campuses energize on time; slips are the swing factor [company-claimed/estimate]
~-$101M net loss and heavy capex; the bull case needs losses to narrow as leased capacity ramps - watch each print [fact]
The preferred is expensive; cheaper refinancing or a completed Cloud Services divestiture (~$570M) that cuts financing need would be a positive tell [fact/estimate]
APLD is a high-beta expression of the AI-DC trade; any hyperscaler/neocloud capex or financing pullback hits the landlord layer too [estimate]
Trends
Drives demand for energized campuses and long-dated leases; the entire bull thesis rests on this persisting [fact/estimate]
Scarcity of grid-connected, interconnect-queued power supports lease rates for those who hold it - APLD's core edge [fact/estimate]
Validates the land-and-power thesis but adds competition for the same MW and tenants; APLD is a pure-pivot developer-landlord [fact]
If APLD qualifies as a REIT and converts backlog to NOI, the multiple can re-rate from developer to REIT - the specific catalyst [company-claimed/estimate]
APLD (~$101M Q3 FY26) and peers post big GAAP losses while contracted revenue scales; financing risk if AI-capex sentiment turns [fact]
APLD's largest tenant is a leveraged neocloud; scrutiny of neocloud credit flows down to the landlord's lease income [estimate]
Ecosystem & competitor graph
Suppliers feed the company; customers pull from it. Line thickness shows the strength of each tie (supply-chain dependency, customer earnings contribution). Hover to isolate a tie.
Lead financing partner - up-to-$5B perpetual preferred (12.75%/yr) + development loans; takes 15% common in the HPC assets, APLD retains 85%
Not a direct supplier to APLD (tenants own the GPUs), but the accelerators racked in APLD's campuses; the demand engine one layer up
Electric utilities / grid operators (North Dakota) Power + grid-interconnect providers for Ellendale/Polaris Forge - the scarce input that gates capacity
Power, cooling, and thermal-management infrastructure for high-density AI-factory campuses
Build-out contractors and liquid-cooling suppliers for the AI-factory shells
Anchor tenant - two ~15-yr leases 250MW + additional 150MW = ~400MW at Ellendale/Polaris Forge 1 ND; ~$7B over terms / ~$11B of backlog (company-claimed) - the largest single tenant
~$5B AI-factory lease at Polaris Forge 2 ND (company-claimed) - the tenant-diversification datapoint
Company-claimed ~70% of the ~$36B contracted backlog backed by IG hyperscalers
The other CoreWeave-counterparty miner-pivot (~590MW / >$10B contracted); stayed independent after shareholders rejected CoreWeave's buyout - the closest US-listed comp for the CoreWeave-landlord trade [fact]
Full miner-to-AI-DC pivot (~360MW Lake Mariner) with Google ~14% equity and a Fluidstack/Google-backstopped tenant; competes for the same AI-DC lease demand [fact]
Miner-pivot with its entire ~300MW Barber Lake site leased under a Google backstop; another listed way to play the land+power layer [fact]
Aus-domiciled/US-listed miner-pivot (flagged non-US) with a direct Microsoft (~$9.7B) + Nvidia (~$3.4B) anchor and an OWNED-GPU AI Cloud model rather than pure shell-leasing - a different, more integrated model [fact/flag: non-US domicile]
APLD's anchor TENANT, not a direct competitor - but its neocloud credit and capex appetite drive APLD's largest lease; the dependency is the key linkage, not rivalry [fact]
Established, investment-grade data-center REITs building AI/HPC capacity; the multiple APLD's REIT conversion aspires to - and a well-capitalized competitor for hyperscaler leases [fact]