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Lectio Socialis · 13 Nov 2026

Regulatory architecture and the political economy of cybersecurity: A comparative analysis of banking governance in Türkiye and the United States

Furkan Yıldızh-index 1, Ahmet Oğuz Akgüneşh-index 5

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Ahmet Oğuz Akgüneş, in QAI's scholar index
23
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Abstract

This study investigates how regulatory architecture shapes cybersecurity governance in the banking sectors of Türkiye and the United States through a structured comparative analysis of systemically important institutions. While highlighting the capacity of existing literature, this article argues that organisational structure and regulatory design are at least as important as resource capacity in shaping cybersecurity governance. Drawing on the frameworks of Institutional Complementarity and Varieties of Capitalism, the study operationalises key variables such as regulatory centralisation, compliance mechanisms and organisational capacity. The findings suggest that Türkiye's relatively centralised and consistent regulatory framework — anchored in a single prudential supervisor (the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, BDDK) within a layered structure that also includes cybersecurity and data-protection authorities — appears to promote regulatory clarity and coordination, which may partly offset resource constraints — a hypothesis that the study does not test directly. In contrast, the United States’ fragmented multi-agency structure, despite significant financial and technological advantages, gives rise to regulatory complexity and coordination costs. The analysis also suggests that cybersecurity in the banking sector exhibits characteristics of market failure, including insufficient investment and negative externalities, which supports the case for mandatory state intervention. By linking regulatory design to corporate behaviour and systemic risk management, the study contributes to the political economy of cybersecurity governance. The findings highlight the importance of regulatory consistency and international coordination in combating international cyber threats and ensuring the resilience of the financial system.

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  • No database records a citation yet, as is usual for a paper this new.
  • Ahmet Oğuz Akgüneş has the highest h-index among the authors (5).

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Regulatory architecture and the political economy of cybersecurity: A comparative analysis of banking governance in Türkiye and the United States - QAI OpenResearch