Skills

offensive-basic-exploitation

offensive-basic-exploitation is a skill in SnailSploit/Claude-Red, last changed 6 May 2026. It can touch credentials, turn off system protections, run shell commands, reach the network and name web addresses — read the findings before installing. Our pattern check flagged nothing at commit a8de813 on 27 Oct 2026.

Pattern check: nothing flagged · commit a8de813 · 27 Oct 2026

Install
Licence
MIT
Repo stars
9.6k
Folder last changed
6 May 2026 (opens in a new tab)
Publisher
SnailSploit
Files
1 file
Checked
a8de813 (opens in a new tab) · 27 Oct 2026

Install

Each tab says whether it installs commit a8de813, the one we checked, or the latest version.

No tab for your agent? Use Any agent for OpenCode, Goose, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Zed, Roo Code, Factory Droid, Junie, Amp and Antigravity, and Claude Code for Cline. Kiro needs the folder copied by hand.

Pinned to commit a8de813, the one we checked.

From your project's root folder:

tmp="$(mktemp -d)" &&
  git clone -q --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --no-checkout https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-Red.git "$tmp" &&
  git -C "$tmp" fetch -q --depth 1 origin a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b &&
  git -C "$tmp" sparse-checkout set -- Skills/exploit-dev/offensive-basic-exploitation &&
  git -C "$tmp" checkout -q a8de813edc9f66f60d44cfe42d47750e89d9930b &&
  mkdir -p .claude/skills &&
  mkdir .claude/skills/offensive-basic-exploitation &&
  cp -R "$tmp"/Skills/exploit-dev/offensive-basic-exploitation/. .claude/skills/offensive-basic-exploitation/ &&
  rm -rf "$tmp"

If Claude Code was already running and this created the skills folder, run /reload-skills.

Claude Code docs (opens in a new tab)

What it can touch

From the files and frontmatter at commit a8de813. This is how much a skill can do, not whether it is risky.

What it can touch: Shell, network or credentials

  • Runs shell commands

    Its instructions or files give the agent commands to run on your computer.

  • Reaches the network

    It sends or fetches data over the internet, for example with curl, an HTTP library or a package install.

  • Names web addresses

    It mentions outside web addresses the agent may visit. We list them but don't follow them.

  • Touches credentials

    It reads, asks for or contains keys, tokens, passwords or similar secrets.

    SKILL.md:1084

  • Turns off system protections

    It removes download warnings, adds antivirus exclusions, switches off a firewall or loosens permissions.

    SKILL.md:7415

Pattern check

Pattern check: nothing flagged · commit a8de813 · 27 Oct 2026

We checked every text file in this skill, at commit a8de813 on 27 Oct 2026, against 45 published patterns such as download-and-run commands, hidden text and credential access. We don't run the skill, we don't read the web pages it points to, and we can't judge everything its instructions might lead an agent to do. In published tests, pattern checks like this one missed most malicious skills. Read the skill before you install it — especially anything it asks you to download or run.

How the check worksReport an incorrect finding

Outside links we did not follow

  • https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/5-basic-exploitation.md
  • https://phrack.org/issues/49/14_md#article
  • https://wiki.osdev.org/Calling_Conventions
  • https://eli.thegreenplace.net/2011/09/06/stack-frame-layout-on-x86-64
  • https://github.com/radareorg/radare2
  • https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2014/readings/return-to-libc.pdf
  • https://hovav.net/ucsd/dist/geometry.pdf
  • https://ropemporium.com/
  • https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget
  • https://phrack.org/issues/66/10
Show 29 more
  • https://azeria-labs.com/heap-exploitation-part-1/
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap
  • https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/MallocInternals
  • https://libc.rip/
  • https://github.com/matrix1001/glibc-all-in-one
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/tcache_house_of_spirit.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/tcache_metadata_poisoning.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/tcache_poisoning.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/fastbin_dup.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/house_of_botcake.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/overlapping_chunks.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/large_bin_attack.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/fastbin_reverse_into_tcache.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/unsafe_unlink.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/house_of_water.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/house_of_tangerine.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/house_of_einherjar.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/blob/master/glibc_2.41/safe_link_double_protect.c
  • https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap/tree/master/glibc_2.41
  • https://corgi.rip/posts/leakless_heap_1/
  • https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs_20.04/Files/Format_String/Format_String.pdf
  • https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/28476-linux-format-string-exploitation.pdf
  • https://cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/printf/
  • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use
  • https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/843.html
  • https://portswigger.net/research/smashing-the-state-machine
  • https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity15/sec15-paper-hu.pdf
  • https://www.sei.cmu.edu/downloads/sei-cert-c-coding-standard-2016-v01.pdf
  • https://www.invicti.com/learn/integer-overflow

Format check

Each agent reads SKILL.md a little differently. We check the file against each one's published rules; we don't run the skill in any agent.

  • Agent Skills specFails

    The open format from agentskills.io, held to what the strictest agents enforce, so one folder loads everywhere.

    • Error

      The file doesn't start with a --- line, so it has no frontmatter. The spec requires a name and description there. F3

      Fix: Start the file with ---, then name: and description: lines, then a closing --- line.

    • Warning

      The body is 10780 lines; the spec suggests under 500. B1

      Fix: Move detailed sections into reference files and link to them from SKILL.md.

    • Warning

      The body is about 86,055 tokens (approx.); the spec suggests under 5,000. B2

      Fix: Move detail into reference files that the agent reads only when needed.

  • Claude CodePasses with warnings

    Claude Code reads its own extra fields, ignores unknown ones, and still loads a skill whose frontmatter is broken, without its fields.

    • Warning

      The file doesn't start with a --- line, so it has no frontmatter. Claude Code reads it all as instructions: the name falls back to the folder and the description to the first line. F3

      Fix: Start the file with ---, then name: and description: lines, then a closing --- line.

    • Note

      The body is 10780 lines; the spec suggests under 500. Claude Code's docs say the same. B1

      Fix: Move detailed sections into reference files and link to them from SKILL.md.

    • Note

      The body is about 86,055 tokens (approx.); the spec suggests under 5,000. After compaction Claude Code keeps only the first 5,000 tokens of a skill. B2

      Fix: Move detail into reference files that the agent reads only when needed.

  • Claude apps & API uploadFails

    Uploading to claude.ai or the Claude API, or packaging with Anthropic's script, accepts only the six spec fields and stops on anything else.

    • Error

      The file doesn't start with a --- line, so it has no frontmatter. Anthropic's validator stops with "No YAML frontmatter found". F3

      Fix: Start the file with ---, then name: and description: lines, then a closing --- line.

    • Note

      The body is 10780 lines; the spec suggests under 500. Anthropic's guidance says the same. B1

      Fix: Move detailed sections into reference files and link to them from SKILL.md.

    • Note

      The body is about 86,055 tokens (approx.); the spec suggests under 5,000. Anthropic's guidance says the same. B2

      Fix: Move detail into reference files that the agent reads only when needed.

  • OpenAI (Codex & API)Fails

    Codex finds SKILL.md by its exact name and needs a description; OpenAI's Skills API checks the frontmatter against the spec and caps uploads.

    • Error

      The file doesn't start with a --- line, so it has no frontmatter. Codex can't find a name or description and skips the skill. F3

      Fix: Start the file with ---, then name: and description: lines, then a closing --- line.

  • VS Code & CopilotPasses with warnings

    VS Code reads skills one folder below .github/skills, .claude/skills or .agents/skills and falls back to the folder name when the name is missing or differs; GitHub's Copilot docs require the exact name SKILL.md.

    • Warning

      The file doesn't start with a --- line, so it has no frontmatter. VS Code lists the skill under its folder name with no description for the agent to match. F3

      Fix: Start the file with ---, then name: and description: lines, then a closing --- line.

SKILL.md

Files

1 file

PathSize
SKILL.md (opens in a new tab)346 KB

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